Event tracking and log retention policy
An audit log policy is the set of rules that decides what events get logged, how long the records are kept, and how they are protected from tampering. It governs the trail rather than the system that produces it. The point of the trail is to be believed later, by an auditor reconstructing whether a control ran or an investigator reconstructing a breach. That places one demand above all others: the log must be trustworthy precisely when someone has a motive to alter it. A record that the actor in question could edit proves nothing.
The discipline grew from accounting's audit trail and hardened as security standards made logging a named requirement. ISO 27001 and SOC 2 both expect a documented logging and retention policy, and examiners look for logs that are immutable, so that once a record is written it cannot be changed or deleted, even by an account with super-admin privileges (techclass).
Two parameters define a mature policy. Retention sets how long records survive; one year satisfies common standards like SOC 2, while SOX or HIPAA can demand five years or more (optro). Tamper-evidenceEvidenceValidationData supporting or refuting a hypothesisView reference → sets how alteration is detected or prevented. Best-in-class architectures enforce immutability through Write Once, Read Many storage or by streaming logs to an external server beyond the reach of local admins, and NIST recommends message digests and digital signatures so any modification is detectable (Mattermost). The field's centre of gravity moved from "do you log?" to "can you prove the log was not touched?"
A healthcare platform writes its policy to satisfy both SOC 2 and HIPAA. It logs every access to patient records: who, what record, when, from where. Records stream in real time to append-only WORM storage, each entry carrying a timestamp and a cryptographic hash chained to the entry before it, so deleting one record breaks the chain visibly. Retention is set to six years to meet the strictest applicable rule. Two events test the design. A SOC 2 Type II auditor samples a week and the immutable log produces the evidence on demand. Months later, an employee accesses a record they should not have; the forensic trail shows the exact access, and because the log is tamper-evident, the employee cannot have erased it. The policy did both jobsJobUserJob To Be Done: what the user is trying to accomplishView reference → from the same records.
In the Unified Product Graph, an audit log policy sits in the compliance region as the rule set over the trail. The product connects through Productaudited viaAudit Log Policyhierarchy, making auditability a stated property of the system. The policy answers upward to standards through product_audited_via_audit_log_policyCompliance FrameworkrequiresAudit Log Policyhierarchy, recording that a framework is the reason the policy exists, and downward to structure through compliance_framework_requires_audit_log_policyAudit Log PolicytracksEvent Schemacross-domain, tying the rules to the shape of the events they govern. That places the policy at the junction of why logging is required and how each event is formed, so a framework demanding a trail with no policy to satisfy it becomes a visible gap.audit_log_policy_tracks_event_schema
Type-specific fields on BaseNode
scopestringWhat systems or actions are covered by the audit log
retention_daysnumberNumber of days audit logs are retained
event_typesstring[]Types of events being logged
idstringrequiredUnique identifier (UUID)
typeNodeTyperequiredDiscriminator for the entity type
titlestringrequiredDisplay name
descriptionstringOptional detailed description
statusstringLifecycle status
tagsstring[]Freeform tags for filtering
5 phases — initial: proposed · template: APPROVAL
3 edge types connected to this entity.
product_audited_via_audit_log_policycompliance_framework_requires_audit_log_policyaudit_log_policy_tracks_event_schema